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In an essay on the place of classics in education, Alfred North Whitehead 
wrote, “Moral education is impossible without the habitual vision of great-
ness” since “the sense of greatness is the groundwork of morals.” These 
words have been repeated many times, but rarely by moral philosophers. I 
take these words to hear and have been working on a moral theory I call 
“Exemplarist Moral Theory,” or just “Exemplarism,” which is a theory 
based on direct reference to exemplars of goodness, identified through the 
emotion of admiration. The idea is that a supremely good person is a per-
son who is most admirable, and we identify the admirable through our 
emotion of admiration. Admiration is developed, refined, and altered 
through experience, including the experience of others whom we trust, and 
the cumulative experience of admiration in past ages and in past cultures 
is transmitted to us through stories of exemplars. The set of exemplars 
forms the basis for a theoretical map that I am proposing, a map in which I 
define “virtue,” “good motive,” good life,” “duty,” and other moral terms by 
directly referring to exemplars. An advantage of this theory is that it is 
practically useful. That is because admiration for exemplars is a motivat-
ing force for moral education and self-improvement. 
 I am using “direct reference” in a sense that became famous in the 
1970s, particularly in the form in which it was used by Saul Kripke and 
Hilary Putnam to define natural kind terms, or terms for naturally occur-
ring substances or species, like “water,” “gold,” and “tiger.” Briefly, the 
idea is that “water” is defined as “stuff like that,” “tiger” refers to “crea-
tures like that,” and so on. Direct reference revolutionized semantics be-
cause it meant that we succeed in thinking about and talking about objects 
in the natural world without needing a descriptive meaning in our heads. 
People could talk about water, ask questions about water, and make asser-
tions about water long before they knew that what makes water water is 
that it is H2O. “Water” does not mean and never did mean “colorless, 
odorless liquid that flows in the streams and falls from the sky” because we 





realize upon reflection that something other than the substance water 
could have fallen from the sky, and could have been the liquid we drink, 
and so on. This theory was also revolutionary because of the way it linked 
empirical science with semantics, and it led to a great deal of work on the 
social construction of language. The upshot was that we are not connected 
to the outside world through a description in our heads. We are (or can be) 
connected to it directly. What we are talking about when we say “tiger” or 
“water” or “gold” is determined by observation of something we can pick 
out directly. We do not need a descriptive meaning. 
 Exemplarism is the theory in which I have developed this idea for 
moral terms. The basic idea is that exemplars are persons like that, and we 
point directly to exemplars of goodness like Confucius, Socrates, Jesus, 
Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, Holocaust rescuers, Jean Vanier, or many ordi-
nary people who are known only to a small circle of acquaintances—
perhaps a neighbor or your grandmother. We find out what makes them 
admirable by observation, just as we find out what makes water the sub-
stance that it is by observation. The observation of admirable persons is 
obviously much more complex than the observation of water since the psy-
chological structure of an admirable person is much more complex than 
the physical structure of water, and individual exemplars differ from each 
other much more than individual samples of water. Also, we cannot just 
put admirable persons under a microscope (although neuroimaging of ex-
emplars is currently being done). Rather, we observe them through narra-
tives and more recently, through controlled empirical studies. My proposal 
is that we find out the motivational structure of exemplars by observation, 
and that permits us to define basic moral terms like “good trait of charac-
ter,” “good life,” “good motive,” “right act,” and so on by features of exem-
plars or features of their judgments. We do not need a descriptive meaning 
for terms like “good person,” “good life,” “good trait of character,” “right 
act,” and the other moral terms, any more than we need a descriptive 
meaning for natural kind terms. We observe exemplars through narra-
tives, personal experience, and more recently, empirical studies. Those ob-
servations determine the meaning of moral terms. 
 I propose three basic categories of exemplars: the hero, the saint, 
and the sage. There are many stories about exemplars in these categories, 
although some of them are dominant at certain stages of history or in cer-





tain cultures. I think we are in danger of losing some of these categories of 
exemplars, but fortunately, there is recent empirical research on all of 
them. I know of research on Holocaust rescuers, whom I interpret as mod-
ern heroes. There is also research on many saintly persons, including 
L’Arche caregivers, who sometimes devote many years of their lives to liv-
ing in a community with persons who are mentally and sometimes physi-
cally disabled. There are also recent empirical studies on wisdom, alt-
hough not much of it focuses on particular wise persons, the approach I 
advocate. However, there is a multitude of narratives on the great wise 
persons of the past, such as Jesus, the Buddha, and Confucius, as well as 
contemporary moral leaders, as in Jonathan Lear’s recent book, Radical 
Hope, which interprets Chief Plenty Coups, the last great chief of the Crow 
Nation, as an exemplar of virtue.  
 On the practical side of work on exemplars, there is a lot of new re-
search on emulation of admired persons. A new program on “Moral Bea-
cons,” based at Wake Forest University, is directed by William Fleeson, 
and funded by the Templeton Religion Trust. The projects to be funded by 
this program include multi-disciplinary work on the philosophy, theology, 
and psychology of the morally exceptional.  
 My exemplarist virtue theory is intended to be a philosophical 
framework for studies in many fields. It has a simple theoretical structure 
that I intend to be philosophically comprehensive. It is designed in a way 
that gives a place for empirical work and narratives in the structure of the 
theory. It is intended to permit different versions for different communi-
ties, including Faith communities, but it is also intended to facilitate cross-
cultural discourse through investigation of the overlapping sets of admira-
ble persons in different cultures. It is also constructed with the purpose of 
inserting the motive to be moral into the theoretical structure. I believe 
that admiration is one of the most significant of the human emotions. The 
cognitive side of the emotion has the potential to generate a conceptual 
framework. The affective side of the emotion moves us to emulate the ad-
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